In my previous post, I concluded that when people ask about the meaning of life what they normally want to know is whether an individual person’s life can have an ultimate and objective meaning of a sort that could matter to that individual. In this post I want to consider what that meaning might consist… Read More »
To ask “What is the meaning of life?” presupposes an affirmative answer to the question “Does life have a meaning?” Asking that question, in turn, presupposes that one has some idea of what the phrase “the meaning of life” could mean. What would it mean for life to have a meaning, if it has one?… Read More »
I’ve been busy the last few weeks vacationing, wrapping up my summer projects, and getting ready for the Fall semester. Below is a link to one of my recently finished projects. Entitled “Fumerton’s Principle of Inferential Justification, Skepticism, and the Nature of Inference”, it’s a revision and expansion of some parts of chapter 3 of… Read More »
I’ve just finished revising my paper “Presentism, Truthmakers, and God” and have sent it off to a journal. I made quite a few changes from the earlier version. For those who might be interested, here’s the abstract: Abstract: The truthmaker objection to presentism (the view that what exists simpliciter is coextensive with what exists now)… Read More »
Faithful readers, My wife and I are leaving tomorrow morning for a week in Maui to celebrate our third anniversary. So no more blogging until I get back. Alan PS: I’ve decided to try turning off comment moderation. So your comments will now appear immediately after you post them.
In my previous post I raised some questions about the “Law of Excluded Middle” (LEM), which states that (LEM) For any proposition p, either p is true or p is not-true. The gist of my concern was that if LEM applies across the board then this implies that reality is discrete all the way down,… Read More »
The so-called “Law of Excluded Middle” (LEM) is often taken to be one of the most fundamental laws of logic. It may be expressed as follows: (LEM) For any proposition p, either p is true or p is not-true. LEM is to be distinguished from the Principle of Bivalence (BV), which states: (BV) For any… Read More »
I’ve argued here that the truthmaker objection to presentism is best met by appealing to God’s memories of the past as the truthmakers of true propositions about the past. (Note: Readers of the linked paper should be aware that I am still revising it. Constructive feedback is welcome.) Instead, I will briefly explain how my… Read More »
Awhile back, I did a series of three posts (I, II, and III) in which I was trying to work out the relations between propositions (“props” for short) and states of affairs (“sofas” for short). I’ve since been rethinking things a bit. So here’s my new and (hopefully) improved theory. Earlier I had written that… Read More »