I’m not going to try to settle this question right now, but merely to point out some of the consequences of answering it with either a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’. Charles Peirce once said “The possible is necessarily general; and no amount of general specification can reduce a general class of possibilities to an individual… Read More: Is the Possible Necessarily General? »
A few posts back I suggested that there might be two senses of “exists”: (1) a “there is” sense that functions linguistically as a second-order predicate (i.e., it says of a concept or predicate expression that its extension is non-empty), and (2) an “is actual” sense that functions linguistically as a first-order predicate of individuals.… Read More: Of Unicorns and Possible Worlds »
In my previous post I contemplated the idea that actuality is the ontological delimiter of possibility (ODOP). That’s a mouthful, but what it means basically is that the reason why one thing is possible rather than another is because something that already exists precludes some things from happening and not others. Here’s a simple example:… Read More: Actuality and Two Varieties of Possibility »
I’d like to take this idea out for a test drive. If actuality is the ontological delimiter of possibility (ODOP), what follows? Offhand, it conflicts with the idea that possibility is ontologically prior to actuality, an idea that might seem attractive given that the actual world is generally thought to be one of a vast… Read More: Actuality is the Ontological Delimiter of Possibility »
The question may seem an odd one. If read as asking “Do there exist any objects that do not exist?” the answer is obviously No because the question presupposes a contradiction. But there is another way of reading the question that can be gotten at if we reflect on the relation between actuals, possibles that… Read More: Are There Non-Existent Objects? »
It is often claimed nowadays that “science”, by definition, can only invoke “natural” causes as explanations, where “natural” causes are restricted to entities or laws that will presumably find inclusion in a completed form of physics or to things that are either ontologically reducible to or strongly supervenient on such entities and laws. In short,… Read More: Two Types of Methodological Naturalism »
I read Douglas Adams’ Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy series a few years ago. I found it hilariously funny overall, but by the time I got all the way to the end of the so-called “5-volume trilogy” it had become quite clear to me that Adams’ worldview is fundamentally nihilistic. In other words, existence is… Read More: The Hitchhiker’s Guide to Nihilism »
Sage thoughts from the Maverick Philosopher: Jesse Ventura: “Religion is for the weak!” Religionist: “No it’s not!” Such knee-jerk opposition avails nothing. Ventura is in fact right. What Ventura doesn’t appreciate, however, is that we are all weak. The correct response to Jesse the Body is not one of diametrical opposition but one of ju-jitsu-like… Read More: Is Religion Just for the Weak? »
Anyone who reads much philosophy will encounter a lot of Latin phrases. Leaving formal and informal fallacies out of it, the following are some of the most common. I have translated for the uninitiated. a fortiori – all the more so; e.g., if you can refute a more general or more plausible version of a… Read More: Philosophical Latin in Translation »
In yesterday’s post I gave some background on the Intelligent Design (ID) debate and noted that an increasingly popular move by the mainstream scientific establishment has been to stipulate that “science” requires methodological naturalism. In other words, the claim is that properly “scientific” explanations can only make reference to ‘natural’ laws and entities, the kinds… Read More: Science and Methodological Naturalism »