After a several month blogging hiatus, I’m resuming my eleven-part series responding to the essays in Ben Arbour’s edited volume, Philosophical Essays against Open Theism (Routledge, 2019). In this post I tackle chapter 10 by Ken Perszyk, “Open Theism and the Soteriological Problem of Evil” (pp. 159–177). In this essay Perszyk compares and contrasts Open… Read More: Philosophical Essays against Open Theism – ch. 10: Perszyk »
This is part nine of eleven in a series responding to the essays in Ben Arbour’s edited volume, Philosophical Essays against Open Theism (Routledge, 2019). In this post I tackle chapter 9 by Greg Welty, “Open Theism, Risk-Taking, and the Problem of Evil” (pp. 140–158). Welty’s argument, roughly, is that open theism enjoys virtually no… Read More: Philosophical Essays against Open Theism – ch. 9: Welty »
In my previous post I contrasted four models of divine providence with respect to the retrospective and prospective problems of evil. Here’s another complementary way of looking at the problem of evil in terms of how each model tries to relieve some of the tension caused by evil by adjusting our understanding of the divine… Read More: Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil—Another Take »
There are two sides to the problem of evil: God’s responsibility for evil God’s response to evil. (1) is retrospective; it has to do with God’s complicity in past occurrences of evil. (2) is prospective; it has to do with God’s ability to respond to evil moving forward—to eliminate evil, to bring good out of… Read More: A Providential Trade-Off with Respect to the Retrospective and Prospective… »