A frequent reply to foreknowledge / future contingency incompatibility arguments is that something must be wrong with all such arguments simply because “foreknowledge isn’t causal” and so cannot constrain our freedom. Thus, William Lane Craig writes: “No matter how ingenious the argument, fatalism [i.e., the incompatibilist’s argument] must be wrong. For it posits a constraintā¦ Read More »
At least since Alvin Plantinga’s and David Lewis’s work on modal metaphysics, philosophers have frequently appealed to the notion of counterfactual dependence to analyze concepts like causation and grounding. David Lewis also uses the concept to understand the asymmetry of time: The way the future is depends counterfactually on the way the present is. Ifā¦ Read More »
This is the fifth installment in a series of posts responding to a 2013Ā paperĀ by William Lane Craig and David Hunt (hereafter, C&H) entitled āPerils of the Open Roadā. In the paper C&H critique two papers defending open theism: a 2006Ā paperĀ (hereafter, RBB) that I co-wrote with Greg Boyd and Tom Belt entitled āOpen Theism, Omniscience, andā¦ Read More »
This post is the second in a three-part commentary on philosopher Lydia McGrew’s essay on divine timelessness published in the latest volume of The Christendom Review. In part 1 of this series, I critique three of her arguments in favor of divine timelessness: arguments based on divine transcendence, immutability, and perfection. In part 3, Iā¦ Read More »