Category Archives: preventable futurism

Modality, Fatalism, and the Modal Openness of the Future

Back in 2011, I wrote a paper called “The Fivefold Openness of the Future” in which I argued that if the future is causally open (i.e., not wholly causally determined) then there are strong reasons to think that it is ontically, alethically, epistemically, and providentially open as well. In my 2024 book Open Theism I strengthened… Read More »

Fatalism and the “Modal Fallacy” Fallacy

A common trope in discussions of fatalism is that arguments for fatalism are invariably guilty of a “modal fallacy”, specifically the fallacy of conflating “necessarily, if p then q” with “if p, then necessarily q“. In fancy academic jargon this is known as conflating the necessity of the consequence (i.e., of the whole conditional, if p then q)… Read More »

Open Futurism, Supervaluationism, and Indeterminacy – A Critique of Barnes and Cameron

In my previous post on Ch. 2 of Patrick Todd’s book The Open Future (Oxford 2021), I criticized Todd for confusing supervaluationism with the view defended by Elizabeth Barnes and Ross Cameron in two influential papers. In this post I want to look more closely at the view of Barnes and Cameron (hereafter B&C). For ease of… Read More »

The Impossibility of Simple Foreknowledge

In philosophical theology, simple foreknowledge (SF) is the view that Minimal monotheism is true, i.e., there is one, necessarily existing, personal, omniscient, etc. God who freely creates ex nihilo. God is temporally everlasting and therefore has a past, present, and future. The future is causally open, i.e., there are multiple causally possible futures, and therefore… Read More »