Back in 2011, I wrote a paper called “The Fivefold Openness of the Future” in which I argued that if the future is causally open (i.e., not wholly causally determined) then there are strong reasons to think that it is ontically, alethically, epistemically, and providentially open as well. In my 2024 book Open Theism I strengthened… Read More: Modality, Fatalism, and the Modal Openness of the Future »
Linda Zagzebski, a distinguished philosopher who recently retired from the University of Oklahoma, has written a book titled Fatalism and the Logic of Time (Oxford, 2024). This book is a culmination of many years of reflection on the challenges posed by fatalistic arguments. Thirty-five years previously she wrote a well-received book titled The Dilemma of… Read More: Thoughts on Zagzebski’s “Fatalism and the Logic of Time” »
This is part three of eleven in a series responding to the essays in Ben Arbour’s edited volume, Philosophical Essays against Open Theism (Routledge, 2019). In this post I tackle chapter 3 by Ben Arbour, “A Few Worries About the Systematic Metaphysics of Open Future Open Theism.” Unlike the previous chapter by Visser, this is… Read More: Philosophical Essays against Open Theism – ch. 3: Arbour »
This is part seven of eleven in a series responding to the essays in Ben Arbour’s edited volume, Philosophical Essays against Open Theism (Routledge, 2019). In this post I tackle chapter 7 by Robert B. Stewart, “On Open Theism Either God Has False Beliefs, or I Can Know Something That God Cannot” (pp. 110–118). This… Read More: Philosophical Essays against Open Theism – ch. 7: Stewart »
This is the 9th and final installment of my series on Patrick Todd’s recently published book The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False (Oxford, 2021). (Previous installments: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.) In this chapter Todd tackles the “assertion problem” for open futurism. He’s quick to clarify that it’s not… Read More: Todd (ch.8) – The Assertion Problem »
This is part 7 of my ongoing series on Patrick Todd’s recently published book The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False (Oxford, 2021). (Previous installments: part 1, part 2, part 3, part 4, part 5, and part 6.) This post continues my discussion of Ch.6, focusing on pp. 129–147, which is concerned with… Read More: Todd (ch.6) – Part 2: Probability and the Open Future »
A common trope in discussions of fatalism is that arguments for fatalism are invariably guilty of a “modal fallacy”, specifically the fallacy of conflating “necessarily, if p then q” with “if p, then necessarily q“. In fancy academic jargon this is known as conflating the necessity of the consequence (i.e., of the whole conditional, if p then q)… Read More: Fatalism and the “Modal Fallacy” Fallacy »
In my previous post on Ch. 2 of Patrick Todd’s book The Open Future (Oxford 2021), I criticized Todd for confusing supervaluationism with the view defended by Elizabeth Barnes and Ross Cameron in two influential papers. In this post I want to look more closely at the view of Barnes and Cameron (hereafter B&C). For ease of… Read More: Open Futurism, Supervaluationism, and Indeterminacy – A Critique of Barnes… »