This is my third and final post on Kirk MacGregorās book,Ā Molinist Philosophical and Theological Ventures (2022). My first post dealt with chapters 1ā3. My second post dealt with chapter 4. This post covers chapters 5ā6 and part of the concluding chapter. In Chapter 5 MacGregor defends Molinism’s Biblical credentials against various open theism friendly prooftexts.ā¦ Read More »
I have finished reading Kirk MacGregor’s new book defending Molinism. In my previous post I commented on his first 3 chapters and shared why I don’t think his reply to the grounding objection to Molinism is any good. I plan to do another blog post on chapters 4ā6 of MacGregor’s book. But right now Iā¦ Read More »
This is the 9th and final installment of my series on Patrick Toddās recently published book The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False (Oxford, 2021). (Previous installments: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.) In this chapter Todd tackles the “assertion problem” for open futurism. He’s quick to clarify that it’s notā¦ Read More »
This is part 8 of my ongoing series on Patrick Toddās recently published book The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False (Oxford, 2021). (Previous installments: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.) In Chapter 7 Todd and his coauthor, Brian Rabern, tackle a view that they dub “open-closurism”. It’s the view espoused byā¦ Read More »
This is part 4 of my ongoing series on Patrick Toddās recently published book The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False (Oxford, 2021). You can find part 1 here, part 2 here, and part 3 here. Ch. 3 dealt with will excluded middle (WEM), the thesis that Fp āØ F~p (i.e., that forā¦ Read More »
This is part 2 of my ongoing series on Patrick Toddās recently published book The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False (Oxford, 2021). You can find part 1 here. In chapter 2, Todd compares and contrasts “three models of the undetermined future” and proposes a unified semantics for the future tense. I argueā¦ Read More »
In my previous two posts I have discussed the correspondence theory of truth and disquotation principles. In this post I’m going to use the former to argue against the latter.Ā More specifically, I’m going to argue that the “if and only if” of the disquotation principles should be merely an “only if”. In other words, insteadā¦ Read More »
In my previous post I talked about the correspondence theory of truth and its relation to truthmaker theory. I’m going to follow itĀ up with a series of posts on various issues concerning truth and ontology that I’ve been mulling over off-and-on over the past several years.Ā The current post concerns disquotation principles. I distinguish between sententialā¦ Read More »
This is the fourthĀ installment in a series of posts in which I respond to a recent 2013Ā paperĀ entitled āPerils of the Open Roadā authored by William Lane Craig and David Hunt (hereafter, C&H).Ā In their paper C&H critique two papers defending open theism: a 2006Ā paperĀ (hereafter, RBB) that I co-wrote with Greg Boyd and Tom Belt entitled āOpenā¦ Read More »