This is part three of eleven in a series responding to the essays in Ben Arbour’s edited volume, Philosophical Essays against Open Theism (Routledge, 2019). In this post I tackle chapter 3 by Ben Arbour, “A Few Worries About the Systematic Metaphysics of Open Future Open Theism.” Unlike the previous chapter by Visser, this is… Read More »
This is part 4 of my ongoing series on Patrick Todd’s recently published book The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False (Oxford, 2021). You can find part 1 here, part 2 here, and part 3 here. Ch. 3 dealt with will excluded middle (WEM), the thesis that Fp ∨ F~p (i.e., that for… Read More »
In a recent post, I argued that God’s existence is not “logically” necessary but should instead be thought of as “metaphysically” necessary. I also argued there that nothing exists out of logical necessity on the grounds that an ontologically empty world (a null world) is a logically coherent possibility. I subsequently got into a Facebook… Read More »
All theists believe—or should believe—that God’s existence is necessary in a metaphysically robust sense of “necessary”. How, after all, could we unswervingly commit our lives and our futures to an ontologically fragile God, one who could—try as He might to avoid it—cease to exist? Or one who, because He simply got bored with eternity, commit deicide,… Read More »
This post continues a series on issues related to truth. In previous posts I have looked at (a) the correspondence theory of truth and its relation to truthmaking, (b) disquotation principles, and (c) the conflict between correspondence and disquotation principles, to the detriment of the latter. In this post I want to look at a distinction… Read More »